摘要：本文应用2008-2019年A股制造业上市企业数据，以中央环保督察作为外生冲击事件进行准自然实验，采用多期PSM-DID模型分析中央环保督察对企业投资效率的影响。研究结果表明：中央环保督察的实施显著提高了制造业企业的投资效率，并且主要体现于对企业过度投资的抑制而非对企业投资不足的改善。进一步研究发现，降低代理成本和缓解信息不对称是中央环保督察提高企业投资效率的重要渠道机制。此外，中央环保督察对不同地区和不同规模制造业企业投资效率的影响存在异质性。其中，在环境保护力度较弱的地区，中央环保督察对企业投资效率的促进效应更为显著；而对于规模较大的企业，中央环保督察对企业投资效率的提升效果也更为明显。在进行一系列稳健性检验后，本文研究结论依然成立，这为完善中央环保督察的实施机制以及提高企业投资效率提供了参考依据。
关键词：中央环保督察；投资效率；代理成本；信息不对称
Environmental Regulation and Investment Efficiency of Manufacturing Enterprises: A Quasi-natural Experiment of Central Environmental Inspection
Yang Yongcong, Liu Libing, Liu Huiting
Abstract：Taking the Central Environmental Inspection (CEI) as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper examines the effects of the CEI on the investment efficiency of manufacturing enterprises. By collecting the data of A-listed manufacturing enterprises ranging from 2008 to 2019, the multi-period propensity score matching with difference-in-differences (PSM-DID) methodology is employed for empirical analysis. The results indicate that the CEI improve the investment efficiency of manufacturing enterprises significantly, while the effects are mainly reflected in those firms with excessive investment. Further analysis indicates that reducing agency cost and alleviating information asymmetry are important intermediary variables. Meanwhile, there are heterogeneous effects of the CEI on investment efficiency in different regions and enterprises. Specifically, the promotion effect is particularly pronounced in regions with weak environmental regulation, as well as in those firms characterized with large size. The findings provide a reference for the improvement of the investment efficiency of manufacturing enterprises upon environmental regulation.
Keywords：Central Environmental Inspection; Investment Efficiency; Agency Cost; Information Asymmetry
DOI:10.19511/j.cnki.jee.2023.02.004
