摘要：企业漂绿现象层出不穷，严重制约了中国经济的绿色健康发展。面对企业漂绿行为，政府监管时有缺位，环保社会组织的深度参与也尚有不足。本文打破通常的政企二元格局，构建环保社会组织参与下的三方演化博弈模型，考察企业漂绿行为治理过程中各博弈参与方的互动策略和演化均衡，并借助数值仿真分析，模拟环保社会组织专业化水平和公信力等关键参数调整对博弈系统演化的可能影响。主要研究结果表明：环保社会组织专业化水平和公信力的提高均有助于增大政府选择积极规制和企业选择绿色创新的策略倾向。政府和公众对环保社会组织提供的资助均会影响到环保社会组织的参与意愿，且政府过高资助容易诱发政府行政人员懒政怠政，并改变环保社会组织的利益立场。漂绿惩罚、政府信誉损失、企业信誉损失的增加有助于博弈系统演化达到理想状态，但过高的创新补贴由于加大了政府的财政负担会导致演化均衡不稳定。政府应当加快制定相关法律法规，加强对企业“漂绿”行为的惩治力度。
关键词：漂绿；社会组织参与；环境治理；三方演化博弈
Environmental Social Organizations’ Participation in the Governance of Enterprises Greenwashing: Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis
Zhang Ming, Wu Wenqi, Huang Meng, Cong Nan
Abstract: The phenomenon of enterprises greenwashing appears one after another, which seriously restricts the green and healthy development of China's economy. In the face of enterprises greenwashing, government supervision is sometimes absent, and the deep participation of environmental social organizations is also insufficient. This paper breaks the usual dual pattern of government and enterprise in the research related to greenwashing, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model with the participation of environmental social organizations, investigates the interactive strategies and evolutionary equilibrium of all game players in the process of enterprise greenwashing governance, and simulates the possible impact of the adjustment of key parameters such as the specialization level and public trust of environmental social organizations on the evolution game system. The main research results show that the improvement of the professional level and credibility of environmental social organizations will help increase the strategic tendency of the government to choose active regulation and enterprises to choose green innovation. The subsidies provided by the government and the public to environmental social organizations will affect the willingness of environmental social organizations to participate. Moreover, excessive government subsidies can easily induce government administrators to be lazy and change the interests of environmental social organizations. The increase of greenwashing penalty, government reputation loss and enterprise reputation loss will help the evolution of the game system to reach the ideal state, but the excessive innovation subsidy will lead to the instability of the evolution equilibrium due to the increase of the government's financial burden. The government should speed up the formulation of relevant laws and regulations and strengthen the punishment of firms' greenwashing behavior.
Keywords:Greenwashing; Green Innovation; Participation of Social Organizations; Environmental Governance; Tripartite Evolutionary Game
